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 3 
THE POWER OF DIGNITY 
Elizabeth B. Cooper* 
 
When I was born, in 1961, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
considered homosexuality a mental disorder1 and the Stonewall Rebellion 
was eight years away.2  When I was in college, in the early 1980s, I was 
informed that as a gay person I might not satisfy the “character and fitness” 
requirement for admission to the bar.3  And when I attended my first gay 
pride march in June 1985, I stood on the sidelines, too fearful to participate. 
The Supreme Court only heightened my sense of “otherness” when, at 
the end of my first year of law school, it handed down Bowers v. 
Hardwick,4 upholding the constitutionality of sodomy laws, using heinous 
characterizations of gay people to do so.5  That year, although I opted to 
march in the gay pride parade, I was petrified. 
My own experience was not that different from my peers.  Most gay 
people I knew at the time were closeted in at least one part of their lives, 
most often in the workplace or with their families of origin.6  There were 
 
*  Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.  I am indebted to Maurice Aaron 
Neishlos for his wonderful research assistance and critique.  I am very grateful to Clare 
Huntington and Robin Lenhardt for their thoughtful guidance and to Fordham University 
School of Law for its scholarship support.  Many thanks to Professor Scott Cummings for 
providing me with a home at UCLA School of Law when life required that I be in Los 
Angeles, CA. 
 
 1. Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 8, 9, In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (stating that homosexuality was included in the APA-published 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders from 1952 until 1973). 
 2. The Stonewall Rebellion began when transwomen and gay men fought back against 
a police raid of the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar.  Such raids were regular occurrences that 
threatened arrests that could make patrons’ homosexuality public, place their names on sex 
offender registers, cause them to be fired from their jobs, and lose their homes. See 
Stonewall Riots:  The Beginning of the LGBT Movement, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
(June 22, 2009), http://www.civilrights.org/archives/2009/06/449-stonewall.html [http:// 
perma.cc/2F5Y-GXUW]. 
 3. See also Joel Jay Finer, Gay and Lesbian Applicants to the Bar:  Even Lord Devlin 
Could Not Defend Exclusion, Circa 2000, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 231 (2001) (noting that 
gay and lesbian applicants to the bar may have difficulties satisfying the “good moral 
character” standard). 
 4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 5. See infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text (discussing Bowers). 
 6. The impetus to stay in the closet was no doubt reinforced by the fact that during the 
1970s and 1980s, the American disapproval rate of “homosexual behavior” remained 
steadily high, “peaking at 75% in the 1980’s.” ALAN YANG, POLICY INST. OF THE NAT’L GAY 
AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS:  PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY AND 
LESBIAN AMERICANS MOVES TOWARD EQUALITY 1973–1999 2 (1999), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/1999FromWrongsToRig
4 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
few legal protections,7 and no laws could shield gay offspring from the 
wrath of or disownment by their parents, or the shunning by those they 
thought were their friends.  Living in a closet—in even just one part of 
one’s life—was suffocating.  Still, the pressure to stay closeted, for most of 
us, outweighed the need to break through the closet door. 
I have reflected on my own choices to remain partially behind that door.  
My family, some of whom had struggled with my being gay, all remained 
loving.  I knew my career prospects, as an Ivy League college graduate on 
my way to getting a law degree from a top law school, were good.  I had 
doubts, though, about whether I could thrive in a work environment where I 
would have to be closeted; yet, I could not envision coming out.8  Only 
years later did I begin to connect scholarly theories about “stigma,” and 
“spoiled identities,”9 which I explore in greater detail in Part I, with my 
own experiences. 
Many positive social and political changes occurred over the subsequent 
decades,10 reflecting and being led by more LGB individuals coming out,11 
myself included.  This growing acceptance of and respect for LGB 
individuals both contributed to and are reflected in the four Supreme Court 
 
hts.pdf [http://perma.cc/UJC3-N632].  By the 1990s, however, public opinion fairly 
consistently opposed discrimination in employment and housing. See generally id. at 6–11. 
 7. In 1982, Wisconsin was the only state that provided protections from discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. See Timeline of LGBT Rights:  1980s in LGBT Rights, 
EQUALDEX, http://equaldex.com/timeline/1980s (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
8YWC-7XRK].  No other state enacted a statute protecting against discrimination until 
Minnesota in 1993. See Timeline of LGBT Rights:  1990s in LGBT Rights, EQUALDEX, 
http://equaldex.com/timeline/1990s (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/HT66-
ZWJC]. 
 8. At the time, I knew of few, if any, gay law firm partners, public interest lawyers, or 
elected officials, all career tracks I had considered pursuing. 
 9. See infra Part I (discussing stigma). 
 10. Progress, however, was not uniform.  President Bill Clinton, who had created deeper 
alliances with the LGB communities than any other president, Aliyah Frumin, Timeline:  Bill 
Clinton’s Evolution on Gay Rights, MSNBC (Sept. 12, 2013, 9:02 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/timeline-bill-clintons-evolution-gay-rig [http://perma.cc/Q9 
JW-S3DL], also advanced two devastating policies.  The first was Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 
1993, prohibiting gay men and lesbians from serving openly in the military. Dep’t of 
Defense Directive No. 1304.26, encl. 1, § B(8)(a) (Dec. 21, 1993).  The second was the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), permitting states to refuse to recognize the otherwise 
valid marriages of same-sex couples and prohibiting the federal government from legally 
recognizing such marriages. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 11. The devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic, first reported by the Centers for Disease 
Control in 1981, also had the inadvertent impact of making gay men more visible and 
discussions about safe sex and human sexuality a more necessary, and acceptable, part of a 
national conversation. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF HIV/AIDS—UNITED STATES, 1981–2006 585 (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5521.pdf [http://perma.cc/2U92-Q8S3]. 
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cases12 that have profoundly altered the trajectory of lesbian and gay 
rights13 in this country. 
This Essay juxtaposes the historical and judicial equating of 
homosexuality and stigma with the Court’s development of a jurisprudence 
of dignity for gay men and lesbians, culminating in its decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.14  The language of Obergefell reflects an acceptance 
of and respect for gay men and lesbians that—regardless of one’s actual 
desire to marry or attitudes toward the institution of marriage—will 
profoundly change not only how the law treats LGB individuals, but also 
how we are treated by others, as well as how we perceive ourselves.  I do 
not mean to assert that Obergefell is without its flaws,15 or that LGB people 
are without dignity and self-respect absent Obergefell; fundamentally, 
however, the symbolic and genuine power of the Court’s dignity-based 
reasoning is extraordinary. 
Part I of this Essay explores the definition of the term “stigma” and 
examines its role, particularly with regard to the lives of LGB individuals.  
It continues by examining how the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 
served to reify that stigma in law.  Part II looks at the concept of “dignity.”  
It begins with a summary of the Court’s expanding recognition of the 
dignity with which gay men and lesbians do, and ought to, live, as reflected 
in Romer v. Evans,16 Lawrence v. Texas,17 United States v. Windsor,18 and 
 
 12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996).  I refer to these cases, all authored by Justice Kennedy, collectively as the “LGB 
cases.” 
 13. I use “gay men and lesbians” and “LGB” (lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals) 
interchangeably.  Although all of the Supreme Court’s LGB jurisprudence appropriately will 
be mined for ways in which it might further the legal rights and dignity of trans individuals, I 
omit “transgender” (or, the “T” in LGBT) as being beyond the scope of both the Court’s 
current jurisprudence and this Essay. 
 14. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 15. Many have critiqued the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell for its lofty 
language concerning dignity and marriage and its lack of legal specificity. See, e.g., Bradley 
C.S. Watson, We Need Not, and Must Not, Give in to Obergefell, NAT’L REV.  
(July 9, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420934/reclaiming-rule-
law-after-obergefell-bradley-c-s-watson (“[T]he Court—asserting no limiting principle to its 
jurisprudence of dignity—has made further bitter conflict inevitable.”) [http://perma.cc/ 
2CAK-HLJP].  Others have criticized it for focusing on substantive due process rather than 
on equal protection. See Eric Schnurer, Equality for All, U.S. NEWS (June 29, 2015, 2:30 
PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/eric-schnurer/2015/06/29/gay-marriage-
decision-should-have-been-all-about-constitutional-equality (“The problem . . . with 
Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion is its focus on marriage as a fundamental right rather than on 
equality.”) [http://perma.cc/5X2V-DVYX].  Many commentators also expressed significant 
frustration that the Court did not use Obergefell to clarify the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence, particularly regarding tiers of scrutiny. See Richard Epstein, Hard Questions 
on Same-Sex Marriage, HOOVER INSTITUTION (June 19, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/ 
research/hard-questions-same-sex-marriage (“[Justice] Kennedy did not bother to articulate 
what standard of scrutiny, high or low, controls the case.”) [http://perma.cc/C5MN-BM3P]. 
See infra note 59 for a critique of Justice Kennedy’s enthusiastic embrace of marriage. 
 16. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 17. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 18. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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Obergefell v. Hodges.  It then explores how dignity has been used by the 
Court in earlier eras to expand civil rights and more generally.  Finally, Part 
III considers the potential impact in future litigation of the Court’s basing 
so much of its LGB jurisprudence in the due process (liberty) interest in 
dignity, rather than in equal protection.  This Essay concludes with the 
observation that, although the future cannot be predicted, the Court’s use of 
“dignity” in the LGB cases carries significant symbolic, if not also 
practical, weight. 
I.  STIGMA 
More than any other scholar, Erving Goffman has explained what stigma 
is and how it operates.19  He defines the term as “the situation of the 
individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance,”20 due to 
“blemishes of individual character.”21  Perhaps not surprisingly for having 
been written in 1963, Goffman includes homosexuality as a “correctible 
failing” in his category of stigmatizing conditions.22 
Stigma both reflects and reinforces stereotypes.  For example, when first 
meeting a person, even without realizing it, we anticipate what Goffman 
describes as that person’s “virtual social identity,”23 which typically is how 
one is perceived.  One’s “actual social identity” corresponds to an 
individual’s self-perception.24  Stigma can be reinforced externally, when 
negatively assessed by others, as well as by oneself, when internalizing a 
“spoiled” identity.25 
Evidence of the historical stigma associated with being gay is found in 
numerous places.  The narrative opening of this Essay is one of countless 
personal histories to relate this experience.26  Stigma also, however, has 
been structurally reinforced by the law,27 perhaps nowhere more so than in 
 
 19. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:  NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED 
IDENTITY (1963). 
 20. Id. at PREFACE.  The term also is “used to refer to an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting.” Id. at 3. 
 21. Id. at 4.  Goffman identifies two other types of stigma:  “physical deformities” and 
“tribal stigma,” which “equally contaminate all members of a family.” Id.  Goffman uses the 
unfortunate term “the normals” to identify those who do not possess stigma. Id. at 5. 
 22. Id. at 4, 9.  Goffman also includes “mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, 
alcoholism, . . . unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behavior” in the 
category of “blemishes.” Id. at 9.  It is fair to reason, given the forward nature of Goffman’s 
thinking in general, that he would alter this list were he living today. See generally William 
Dicke, Erving Goffman, Sociologist Who Studied Every Day Life, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 
1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/22/obituaries/erving-goffman-sociologist-who-
studied-every-day-life.html (noting that Goffman passed away in 1982) [http://perma.cc/ 
SMK3-BK92]. 
 23. GOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 2. 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, 28 Distinct Takes on Gay Marriage and Stigma, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/28-distinct-
takes-on-gay-marriage-and-stigma/360654/ (collecting letters from individuals on their 
experiences with LGB identity and stigma) [http://perma.cc/73A8-9SKY]. 
 27. The legal enforcement of stigma against gay people also can be found in the 
historical power to bring a defamation suit for being falsely “accused” of being gay. See 
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the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which (temporarily) 
canonized the stigma of being gay.28  There, the Court held not only that “a 
practicing homosexual”29 did not have a right to privacy in his own 
bedroom, but also that it was, “at best, facetious”30 for him to ask that such 
a right be found “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”31  In his now 
infamous concurrence, Chief Justice Burger went on to describe the 
“ancient roots” of the prohibitions against sodomy, citing “Judaeo-Christian 
moral and ethical standards,” Roman law, the English Reformation, and 
 
Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”:  Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual Be 
Defamatory?, 44 GA. L. REV. 739, 753 (2010) (noting that some courts hold that falsely 
identifying someone as gay is “slander per se”).  The Southern District of New York has 
held that because of the evolution in social attitudes, it is no longer defamation per se to call 
someone a homosexual. Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 28. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  Bowers was not the first time the 
Supreme Court assumed the spoiled identity of gay people. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 409 
U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (summarily denying an appeal from the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
which rejected a gay couple’s argument that the Constitution required states to allow 
marriage between two people of the same sex as it did for two people of different races).  
The Supreme Court, of course, is not the only judicial body that has viewed gay men and 
lesbians as stigmatized and perpetuated that stigma. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Florida 
statute prohibiting homosexuals from adopting children is constitutional); Moricoli v. 
Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. 1977) (discussing the word “fag” in connection with 
“an adult human being . . . with reference to a homosexual” and holding that describing an 
individual as such is merely objectionable and does not give rise to a cause of action for 
defamation); see also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 344 (D.C. 1995) 
abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (listing “denials of occupational 
licenses, . . . custody of children and visitation rights, . . . national security clearances 
and . . . the right to enter the country” as limitations associated with discrimination on the 
basis of an individual’s homosexuality). 
 29. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.  In Bowers, the Court referred to lesbian and gay people as 
“homosexuals”; over time, it has become more appropriate to describe people who are 
attracted to members of the same sex as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.  Because of the clinical 
history of the word “homosexual,” anti-gay critics have used the term to suggest that gays 
and lesbians are diseased or disordered. See GLAAD Media Reference Guide—Terms to 
Avoid, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/reference/offensive (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/ULA4-AQ5X]; see also Jeremy W. Peters, The Decline and Fall of the ‘H’ 
Word:  For Many Gays and Lesbians, the Term ‘Homosexual’ is Flinch-Worthy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/fashion/gays-lesbians-the-term-
homosexual.html (noting that it was not until 1987 that the New York Times officially 
permitted use of the terms “gay” or “lesbian,” no longer requiring use of the term 
“homosexual”) [http://perma.cc/LPH7-9Q75]. 
 30. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. 
 31. Id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  The Court 
chose to cast the question as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” id. at 190, rather than the more appropriate 
question of whether “petitioners’ criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy 
in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” as the Court did in Lawrence. Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(observing that “this case is about ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone’” (quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
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Blackstone, as well as the law of the colony, and, later, the state of 
Georgia.32 
As offensive as the language of the Bowers Court was,33 its greatest 
harms stemmed from:  the ongoing criminalization of gay sex in twenty-
four states and the District of Columbia;34 the harm to “the dignity of the 
persons charged” with violating such laws;35 the threat of collateral 
consequences attendant to conviction under these laws;36 and the stigma 
that inherently followed from the existence of such laws, even when they 
were unenforced.37 
Beginning with its 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans, however, the Court 
began a different path, one that saw and rejected the legal stigmatization of 
LGB people, and one that recognized and enhanced our dignity.38  Part II of 
this Essay explores this trajectory. 
II.  THE ROAD TO DIGNITY 
The Court reached a turning point in Romer—striking down an 
amendment to the Colorado constitution that would prohibit “all legislative, 
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
designed to protect . . . homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”39  
Stating that it was applying rational basis review, but in fact applying a 
form of heightened scrutiny, the Court struck down this popularly approved 
 
 32. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196–97 (Burger, J., concurring) (further observing that “[t]o 
hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would 
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching”).  It is worth noting that the Bowers Court had 
been asked to rule on the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy law, which banned certain 
sexual acts in the privacy of one’s home, regardless of the sex of the actors.  The Court 
simply ignored the law as it would apply to heterosexual couples and did not address the 
attendant equal protection claims. See id. at 196 n.8. 
 33. The harsh tone of Bowers helped to propel LGB advocacy:  by the time Lawrence 
was decided seventeen years later, twelve of the states that had sodomy laws in existence in 
1986 had abolished them. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
 34. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193–94. 
 35. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also id. (noting that Bowers’s “continuance as 
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons”). 
 36. As noted by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, consequences of a conviction can include 
having a criminal record, being mandated to register as a sex offender, and being required to 
disclose the conviction on job applications. Id. at 575–76. 
 37. See id. (noting that the non-enforcement of sodomy laws that remain on the books 
might do little to reduce the stigma created by such laws).  Notwithstanding Bowers’s 
relatively short life, it wreaked havoc in the lives of gay men and lesbians for the almost two 
decades it was in effect. See Emily Bazelon, Why Advancing Gay Rights Is All About Good 
Timing, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2012, 5:56 PM) (quoting Elizabeth Sheyn, The Shot Heard Around 
the LGBT World:  Bowers v. Hardwick As a Mobilizing Force for the National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force, 4 J. RACE, GENDER & ETHNICITY 2 (2009)), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2012/10/the_supreme_court_s_terrible
_decision_in_bowers_v_hardwick_was_a_product.html (“Bowers was a major blow to the 
gay rights movement—‘a sign that the Court, and, by extension, society, did not accept 
homosexuals.’”) [http://perma.cc/K3VN-TWDH]. 
 38. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 39. Id. at 624 (describing Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution). 
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amendment,40 expressing disdain for the state’s “imposi[tion of] a broad 
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,”41 as well as for 
the “animus” reflected in the law.42 
Although the Court did not use the term “stigma,” it strongly echoed 
Goffman’s observations about spoiled identity,43 rejecting the 
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (e.g., the 
stigmatized) as a legitimate governmental interest.44  For the first time in 
the Court’s history, it rejected the reification of stigma against gay men and 
lesbians. 
In Lawrence v. Texas, four years later, the Court continued on this 
trajectory, overturning Bowers and rejecting the constitutionality of sodomy 
laws.45  In this context, for the first time, the Court explicitly recognized the 
harm created by stigma against LGB people46 and unambiguously stated 
that they are entitled to be treated with dignity under the law.47 
In this due process case,48 involving both “spatial liberty”49 and the 
“liberty of the person,” the Court recognized that gay men and lesbians 
 
 40. Id. at 632–36.  The decision was critiqued less for its outcome, which hardly had 
been predetermined (as noted by Justice Scalia in his dissent, Bowers was still good law at 
the time, having been decided only ten years earlier, id. at 636), but more for the Court’s 
sleight of hand in stating it was using a rational basis analysis but very clearly employing a 
more demanding “rational basis with bite” review. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 777–778 (2011) (discussing the impact of Romer and 
how the Court has viewed Romer over time); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, 
Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247, 252 (1996) (criticizing Romer for its confusing and 
contradictory standard of review and stating that the Court employed “rational basis review 
that would be entirely consistent with a future determination that gay people require 
heightened judicial protection”). 
 41. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 42. Id.  The Court further stated that it could not permit “classifications [to be] drawn for 
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” Id. at 633. 
 43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 44. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973)). 
 45. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today.  [It] should be and now is overruled.”). 
 46. See id. at 575 (explaining that the stigma of the Texas law would remain if the Court 
were to assess it as a matter of equal protection); see also id. at 584 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (describing the Texas sodomy law as “subject[ing] homosexuals to ‘a lifelong 
penalty and stigma’” and “[a] legislative classification that threatens the creation of an 
underclass” (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
 47. Id. at 558 (stating that adults may “choose to enter upon [a private, sexual] 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their 
dignity as free persons”). 
 48. Justice Kennedy’s opinion drew directly from the Court’s due process precedent. Id. 
at 564–66 (citing Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (permitting minors to 
obtain access to contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a woman’s 
right, with certain limitations, to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972) (nonmarried people have a constitutional right to use contraceptives); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (acknowledging the right to privacy in the marital 
bedroom concerning use of contraceptives); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
(affirming a parent’s right to direct the education of their child); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923) (permitting the teaching of modern foreign languages to children during 
times of peace)).  The Court also relied significantly on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting 
10 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
were entitled to the same “freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct”50 in the home that heterosexuals long had 
expected.  The Court’s language and its holding reflected an understanding 
of and respect for gay men and lesbians never before articulated by the 
Court.51 
Ten years later, in United States v. Windsor,52 the Court identified the 
role of stigma in Congress’s enactment of section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act53 (DOMA) and in the enforcement of the law.54  The Court 
spoke not only of the dignity to which gay men and lesbians are entitled,55 
but also of the dignity that is found in and should inure to their 
relationships.56  Nominally applying rational basis review, the Court found 
“no legitimate purpose” for DOMA’s “purpose and effect to disparage and 
to injure”57 gay and lesbian married couples and, as such, found that the 
statute constituted a deprivation of liberty grounded in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.58 
 
Casey’s statement that a person’s “intimate and personal choices” are “central to personal 
dignity and autonomy” under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted 
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Lawrence was, however, criticized by some for its limited scope and application. 
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004) (criticizing Lawrence for its “domesticated” conception 
of liberty that failed to present “a robust conception of sexual freedom”). 
 52. Following the death of her same-sex spouse, Thea Spyer, Edith Windsor challenged 
the IRS’s denial, based on DOMA, of a marital exemption from paying federal estate tax 
($363,053). United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–84 (2013). 
 53. See generally id. 
 54. Id. at 2693 (observing that DOMA’s “avowed purpose and practical effect . . . are to 
impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex 
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States”).  Although the Court 
used the specific term only once, it repeatedly used analogous language to criticize DOMA 
as creating “second-class marriages,” id. at 2693; deliberately making “a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages . . . unequal,” id. at 2694; ensuring that “otherwise valid marriages are 
unworthy of federal recognition,” id.; establishing a “second-tier marriage” that “demeans 
the couple,” id.; burdening lives “by reason of government decree, in visible and public 
ways,” id.; and “demean[ing] those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage,” id. at 
2695. 
 55. Id. at 2694 (in relation to marriage, “[r]esponsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the 
dignity and integrity of the person”); see also id. at 2696 (concluding that a state that has 
extended its marriage laws to same-sex couples has acted “to protect [their] personhood and 
dignity”). 
 56. Id. at 2692 (observing that “the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right 
to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import”); see also id. 
(describing New York State’s recognition of marriages entered into by same-sex couples in 
other jurisdictions, and the state’s ultimate granting of marriage rights, as acts of dignity); id. 
at 2693 (DOMA constitutes an “interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages”); 
cf. id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that marriage carries with it a 
“concomitant conferral of dignity and status”). 
 57. See id. at 2696. 
 58. Id. at 2695. 
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Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court reiterated its trope on 
dignity, focusing particularly on the dignity of the institution of marriage.59  
The historical exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, noted the 
Court, is insufficient to justify their continued exclusion,60 observing that 
such laws “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic 
charter.”61 
The Court could not reach this conclusion absent its cogent 
understanding of the capacity of gay men and lesbians to enter into loving, 
devoted relationships.62  Finding that marriage itself is a fundamental right 
 
 59. The Court described the place of marriage in American law, society and culture as 
one of “transcendent importance,” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94 (2015), 
one providing both “material benefits” and “symbolic recognition.” Id. at 2601; see also id. 
at 2590 (stating that, absent the support of marriage, “[s]ame-sex couples are consigned to an 
instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives”).  The 
Court reinforces the primacy of marriage throughout the opinion, see id. at 2602 (referring to 
“the transcendent purposes of marriage”); id. at 2600 (“The right to marry thus dignifies 
couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other.’” (quoting 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689)), but perhaps no less so than in its final paragraph: 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of 
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.  In forming a marital union, two 
people become something greater than once they were.  [Petitioners’] hope is not 
to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest 
institutions. 
Id. at 2608.  I join those who have expressed frustration at the Court’s excessive focus 
on the dignity of marriage, failing to acknowledge that some individuals choose to not, 
or otherwise do not, couple and that some couples prefer not to marry. See also Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Dangers of a Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity’, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 29, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-doctrine-of-
dignity/391796/ (criticizing Kennedy’s consistent focus on dignity as potentially 
inconsistent with the roots of dignity in the Constitution) [http://perma.cc/J9N8-
HMBM]; NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (reframing the family rights discussion by arguing 
that people live in a variety of familial configurations (including marriage), all of which 
deserve merit, dignity, and legal recognition). 
 60. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (observing that, although history can guide the 
Court, it does “not set its outer boundaries”); id. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who 
exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued 
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”).  The Court noted many 
aspects of marriage that have “evolved over time.” Id. at 2595.  For example, although 
marriage once was “based on political, religious, and financial concerns,” one now chooses 
one’s own partner. Id. at 2595; see also id. at 2599 (noting that “decisions concerning 
marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make”).  Coverture, once a part 
of marriage, has been abolished. Id. at 2595.  Further, the Court itself has invalidated bans on 
interracial marriages, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), determined that owed child 
support cannot serve as a barrier to marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and 
ruled that inmates do not lose the right to marry simply due to incarceration, Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  As noted by the Obergefell Court, “[T]he institution has evolved 
in substantial ways over time, superseding rules related to parental consent, gender, and race 
once thought by many to be essential.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.  Notably, the Court 
did not mention the historic exclusion of slaves from the right to marry.  For a more 
thorough exploration of the Court’s handling of issues concerning race, sex and law, see 
R.A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (2015). 
 61. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 62. See id. (“[E]xclusion [of gays and lesbians] from [marriage] has the effect of 
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects.  It demeans gays and 
lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.  Same-
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found in the liberty guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,63 the Court held that “the reasons marriage is fundamental 
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”64 
The Court’s progression from reinforcing gay-related stigma (Bowers), to 
implicitly acknowledging its destructive role (Romer), to explicitly rejecting 
such stigma and embracing—and therefore enhancing—the dignity of gay 
men and lesbians (Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell), in less than thirty 
years, has been extraordinary. 
The Obergefell decision, striking down the stigma of marriage inequality 
and emphasizing the equal dignity to which gay couples are entitled, has 
been described as the “Brown v. Board of Education of the LGB 
community.”  There is no doubt that in its rhetoric, this is so.  What remains 
to be seen is how well the Court’s language and reasoning—based largely 
in liberty/dignity and due process, rather than equal protection—can 
reinforce the rights of individual gay men and lesbians and withstand the 
test of time.  The next part of this Essay begins to explore these questions 
by looking at how the Court has employed “dignity” in other contexts. 
III.  THE ROLE OF DIGNITY 
The Court, through Justice Kennedy,65 has made significant use of 
“dignity,” particularly in relation to due process liberty jurisprudence and, 
 
sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in 
its highest meaning.”); id. at 2599 (“There is dignity in the bond between two men or two 
women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”).  The 
Court also noted that historically, “homosexuals [did not] have dignity in their own distinct 
identity.” Id. at 2596.  Finally, the Court observed numerous times that “[t]he nature of 
injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.” Id. at 2598; see also, e.g., 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Dred Scott to Barack Obama:  The Ebb and Flow of Race 
Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2009) (charting the development of race-
based jurisprudence in the United States and discussing how evolving concepts of justice and 
equality have informed the Court’s decisions over time). 
 63. The Court rested its conclusion that marriage is a fundamental right on four 
principles:  First, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept 
of individual autonomy”; there is an “abiding connection between marriage and liberty.” 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.  Second, marriage “supports a two-person union unlike any 
other in its importance to the committed individuals.” Id.  Third, marriage “safeguards 
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, 
procreation, and education.” Id. at 2600.  When their parents cannot marry, children suffer a 
loss of material benefits and experience “the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser.” Id.  Finally, “marriage is a keystone of our social order.” Id. at 2601; see also id. at 
2597 (noting that among the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs”). 
 64. Id. at 2599.  To stop at Lawrence, said the Court, would not be enough:  “Outlaw to 
outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.” Id. at 
2600.  The Court also relied on its earlier reasoning in Lawrence, where it held that “same-
sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.” Id.; 
see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 65. Justice Kennedy authored all four LGB cases.  The Justice sees animus against and 
reinforces dignity in the lives of LGB individuals; but as others have observed, he is less 
likely to identify animus, harm, or discrimination in claims alleging discrimination based on 
race or sex. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 STANFORD L. REV. 
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quite less so, in relation to equality and the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence.66  Building off of the work of Bruce Ackerman and Kenji 
Yoshino, Part III.A explores how the Court has used dignity to help expand 
the scope of civil rights, starting with the reasoning it used in Brown v. 
Board of Education.67  Then, Part III.B employs Leslie Meltzer Henry’s 
analysis of the five chief ways the Court has used dignity over the ages68 to 
discuss the historical antecedents to the LGB line of cases. 
A.  Dignity As a Mechanism for Establishing Civil Rights 
Many commentators have criticized the Obergefell Court for failing to 
address directly the claimants’ equal protection arguments, with much of 
this criticism focusing on the Court’s sidestepping the question of whether 
gay men and lesbians should be treated as a protected class.69  With lower 
courts holding that heightened scrutiny should be applied to such 
challenges,70 many expressed hope that the Court would resolve this issue 
once and for all.  Justice Kennedy, however, took a different tack, 
harkening back, says Bruce Ackerman, to the Court’s approach and 
language in Brown71 and employed by the Justice in Windsor.72 
 
(forthcoming May 2015); Rick Hasen, Why Does J. Kennedy Leave Affirmative Action, But 
Not Gay Rights, to the Democratic Process?, ELECTION LAW BLOG (June 26, 2015, 8:46 
AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73793 [http://perma.cc/8CFC-Q9Y4]. 
 66. Windsor did not wholly disregard notions of equality. See, e.g., United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (observing that the states that already permitted 
same-sex couples to marry at the time of the Windsor decision had “decided that same-sex 
couples should have the right to marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union 
and in a status of equality with all other married persons”); id. at 2693 (noting “evolving 
understanding of the meaning of equality” in the context of marriage).  Nor did Obergefell 
ignore the importance of equality principles: 
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the 
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the 
equal protection of the laws.  The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent 
principles. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03; see also id. at 2603 (“[O]ne Clause may be thought to 
capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two 
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. . . .  This interrelation 
of the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.”); id. 
(discussing the “synergy between the two protections” and noting that “[e]ach concept—
liberty and equal protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other”). 
 67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 68. See infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Schnurer, supra note 15. 
 70. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 978–79 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(intermediate scrutiny), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(rational basis), cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015), rev’d 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 71. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (referring to the feelings of inferiority experienced by Black 
children caused by segregated education). 
 72. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (using substantive due 
process (liberty interest in dignity) to conclude that the Constitution requires that gay 
couples must be permitted to marry). 
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Bruce Ackerman, in his work exploring the civil rights cases addressed 
by the Court in the 1950s and 1960s, identifies this philosophical thread as 
the “anti-humiliation principle.”73  By asking the question of whether 
segregated education worked to humiliate Black children,74 Ackerman 
states that Chief Justice Warren could reach no other conclusion but that it 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”75  
In turn, the Court unanimously proclaimed that “the doctrine of ‘separate 
but equal’ has no place” in the American educational system.76 
Ackerman expresses regret that this groundbreaking77 “anti-humiliation” 
line of inquiry largely was abandoned by the Court through the remainder 
of the civil rights period.78  He goes on to critique Loving v. Virginia and 
other civil rights cases that have employed a tiered-based equal protection 
analysis as “technocratic doctrinal formulations” that have replaced anti-
humiliation principles79 and argues that we should see Loving “as a 
supplement to, not a substitute for,” the anti-humiliation principles found in 
Brown.80 
 
 73. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 128 (2014); see also Kenji Yoshino, The 
Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076 (2014); cf. Deborah 
Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of Respect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036 (2014) (asserting that 
“the concept of humiliation doesn’t quite work to capture what makes segregation and other 
discrimination violate equal protection”). 
 74. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 483. See also ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 131 
(noting that Justice Warren “was insisting that the Constitution called upon the Justices to 
use [Karl Llewellyn’s concept of ‘situation-sense’] to determine whether segregated schools 
systematically humiliated black children” (citation omitted)).  Ackerman distinguishes 
between personal humiliation (“a face-to-face insult in which the victim acquiesces in the 
effort to impugn his standing as a minimally competent actor within a particular sphere of 
life”), id. at 137–40, and the “systematic degradation” of institutionalized humiliation 
(“social practices that strip an entire group of [the ongoing] presumption [of competence]”), 
id. at 139–40. 
 75. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 132 (observing that 
“southern-style school segregation was indeed usually interpreted by schoolchildren and 
their parents as humiliating” and that “[j]udicial situation-sense was enough to vindicate this 
key conclusion”). 
 76. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 77. Ackerman asserts that the “master insight” of Brown was “the Court’s emphasis on 
the distinctive wrongness of institutionalized humiliation.” ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 
128. 
 78. See id. at 133 (discussing “Brown’s lost logic”); see also id. at 134 (noting the 
“paradox” that, “while Warren’s words inaugurated a great constitutional debate over the 
next decade, the Court didn’t participate on an ongoing basis”).  Ackerman specifically 
critiques the Loving Court for its rights-based, equal protection approach, arguing that the 
Court should have focused on how “the marriage ban forced interracial couples to present 
their relationship to the larger community as if it were diseased, disreputable, criminal.” Id. 
at 302.  In other words, it should have addressed the stigma of antimiscegenation laws. See 
Yoshino, supra note 73, at 3080. 
 79. Yoshino, supra note 73, at 3078 (discussing ACKERMAN, supra note 73); see also 
ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 291 (observing that the Court in Loving shifted “doctrinal 
attention away from Brown’s focus on the real-world humiliations of interracial couples” and 
focused instead “on the suspect purposes of the legislators who imposed the marriage bans”). 
 80. ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 291.  Ackerman describes Loving as adopting “a very 
conservative doctrinal approach,” id. at 295, and goes so far as to “deny that Loving deserves 
a central place in the civil rights canon.” Id. at 291; cf. id. at 301 (acknowledging that, 
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Kenji Yoshino makes Ackerman’s theory all the more poignant, and 
relevant to this discussion, with his observation that Ackerman should have 
further developed the concept of “dignity” (rather than “anti-humiliation”), 
as the opposite of “humiliation.”81  I agree, and would go further, asserting 
that humiliation and stigma, at least in the context of the LGB cases, are 
significantly the same, and that the “opposite” of both terms is dignity.82 
Yoshino also asserts that the Court revitalized the anti-
humiliation/dignity principle in Lawrence,83 rather than Windsor, as 
described by Ackerman.84  I again would go further, asserting that the 
Romer Court first rehabilitated Ackerman’s “anti-humiliation” principle by, 
for the first time, implicitly recognizing the potential for the law to 
stigmatize gay men and lesbians.85  The Court then explicitly discussed and 
recognized stigma in the lives of LGB individuals in Lawrence, developed 
it further in Windsor, and recognized its full potential by establishing 
marriage equality, based on the liberty interest in dignity, in Obergefell. 
With all of this discussion about dignity, however, I have not yet 
explored its importance as a jurisprudential theory.  The next section does 
just that. 
B.  Dignity Is More than One Concept 
The concept of dignity is not without its critics.  The dissenters in 
Lawrence and Obergefell express great disdain for the majority’s use of this 
term.  In particular, Justice Thomas’s Obergefell dissent asserts that “the 
Constitution contains no ‘dignity’ Clause” and states that, even if such a 
 
because of the “southern resistance to desegregation” and the “anxieties over black-white 
sex,” to some, “it was only prudent” that the Loving Court “avoid linking its decision too 
tightly to Brown’s emphatic condemnation of the dual school system”). 
 81. Yoshino, supra note 73, at 3082 (“This link should be intuitive—what, after all, is 
the opposite of ‘humiliation’ but ‘dignity’?”). 
 82. Although the Brown Court also did not use the term “stigma,” it is evident, as 
Ackerman notes, that it was concerned with “real-world stigma.” ACKERMAN, supra note 73, 
at 302; see also supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing Goffman’s definition 
of stigma). 
 83. Yoshino, supra note 73, at 3082–83 (“[T]he Court’s invocation of dignity—and 
Ackerman’s anti-humiliation principle—began not with United States v. Windsor but 
with . . . Lawrence v. Texas.”). 
 84. See ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 308 (“Justice Kennedy’s opinion [in Windsor] was 
simply a restatement of Brown’s anti-humiliation principle.”).  Ackerman goes on to observe 
the “parallelisms” between Brown and Windsor when comparing Justice Kennedy’s 
emphasis in Windsor on “the ‘humiliat[ions]’ DOMA imposed on ‘tens of thousands of 
children now being raised by same-sex couples . . . mak[ing] it even more difficult for the 
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with 
other families in their community and in their daily lives’” with Justice Warren’s statement 
in Brown that school segregation was unacceptable “on the ground that it gives children ‘a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.’” Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). 
 85. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text (discussing the Colorado Amendment 
as “imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group” and the 
“animus” reflected in the law, as well as its “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group”). 
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clause did exist, “the government would be incapable of bestowing 
dignity.”86 
Dignity, however, is neither a new nor uniform concept employed by the 
Court.  Leslie Meltzer Henry has conducted a thorough and brilliant 
interrogation of the Court’s use of dignity,87 identifying five different 
conceptions of the term:  institutional status as dignity,88 equality as 
dignity,89 liberty as dignity,90 personal integrity as dignity,91 and collective 
virtue as dignity.92 
Of greatest import to this inquiry are the categories of “equality as 
dignity” and “liberty as dignity.”  The “equality as dignity” approach can be 
seen in the Court’s antidiscrimination cases, primarily through its equal 
protection jurisprudence.93  Fundamentally, Henry writes, the Court uses 
“equality as dignity to direct attention to the nature of the harm that 
 
 86. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see 
also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mocking the Court’s reliance on 
dignity to find for Windsor).  The type of liberty described by Justice Thomas in his 
Obergefell dissent is just one type of liberty, one that Leslie Meltzer Henry classifies as 
“integrity as dignity,” which recognizes each person’s inherent “moral worth and self-
respect.” Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 215 
(2011).  Thus, “[a] slave, who has been deprived of equality and liberty as dignity, can 
nevertheless possess personal integrity as dignity by expressing his sense of moral worth and 
self-respect in the face of oppression.” Id. 
 87. Henry, supra note 86.  Henry takes what she describes as a “Wittgensteinian 
approach to conceptualizing [dignity],” meaning that it “has multiple meanings that . . . share 
‘family resemblances’ to each other,” but which only can be understood properly when 
viewed in context. Id. at 177.  She rejects the approach of other theorists who argue that the 
term is one “in crisis,” “vague,” or otherwise flawed. See id. at 174–75. 
 88. Id. at 190–99.  The “institutional status as dignity” can be “gained or lost” and is 
“both inegalitarian and contingent.” Id. at 192.  The Court has used this iteration of dignity 
to “bestow respect” on sovereign states and their official representatives. Id. at 192–99. 
 89. Id. at 199–205.  The three central elements to “equality as dignity” are:  (1) “dignity 
is universal,” (2) “dignity is permanent,” and (3) because dignity is “relational . . . all 
humans owe respect to, and deserve respect from, each other as beings of equal worth.” Id. at 
202–03. 
 90. Id. at 206–12; see infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing “liberty as 
dignity”). 
 91. Henry, supra note 86, at 212–20.  Henry describes the category of “personal 
integrity as dignity” as applying “both to people who convey a constellation of virtuous 
characteristics and to those who are prevented by circumstance from expressing such 
characteristics.” Id. at 215.  Although Henry does not discuss the possibility, I believe this 
characterization of dignity also could be applied to the LGB cases. See infra note 98 and 
accompanying text (discussing personal integrity as dignity as a philosophical foundation for 
the Court’s use of dignity in these cases). 
 92. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing “collective virtue as dignity”).  
Henry raises the concern that the Court already has used the “collective virtue as dignity” to 
trump “liberty as dignity” in its abortion jurisprudence. Henry, supra note 86, at 227–28.  
More specifically, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003 on the grounds that it showed “respect for the dignity of human life,” trumping a 
pregnant woman’s “claims to liberty as dignity, on which prior abortion jurisprudence had 
largely rested.” Henry, supra note 86, at 227 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
157 (2007)). 
 93. Henry, supra note 86, at 203–04 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that the purpose of Title II (public accommodations) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 “was to ‘vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments’”)). 
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marginalized individuals or groups experience as the result of differential 
treatment.”94 
Henry identifies the roots of “liberty as dignity” as Kantian, built on his 
belief that “human dignity derives from autonomy.”95  She observes that 
this form of dignity has been most useful to the Court when addressing 
“cases involving personal decisions,” particularly reproductive freedom96 
and same-sex intimacy.97 
Although Henry does not recognize the role of “integrity as dignity” in 
the LGB cases, to the extent this category includes those “situations in 
which a person is only able to present himself as a part of his full self, 
rather than a unified, composed, or collected whole,”98 there is merit in 
considering the relevance of this category of dignity in the context of the 
LGB cases as well.  It is possible, further, that the Court would recognize 
Henry’s “collective virtue as dignity” in these cases:  by treating (LGB) 
individuals and communities with dignity, our societal virtue is enhanced.99 
Looking to both Ackerman and Henry’s analyses, then, Justice 
Kennedy’s drawing on dignity so emphatically throughout the LGB cases 
seems much less of an outlier than it might originally seem.  Ackerman 
identifies Brown as the original case to use “anti-humiliation” (anti-
stigma/pro-dignity) principles to secure civil rights.100  And, Henry reminds 
us of the rich history of the Court’s use of “dignity.”101  Drawing from 
 
 94. Id. at 205. 
 95. Id. at 207 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 
(1785)) (“[Dignity requires] not only an obligation to respect people’s free will, but also the 
concomitant obligation not to abrogate it.”). 
 96. Id. at 209–10 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality opinion); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obst. & Gyne., 476 U.S. 747 (1986) 
(Blackmun, J.) (describing a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy as among the most 
“personal and intimate” decisions, “basic to individual dignity and autonomy”), overruled in 
part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (access to 
contraception for unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (access 
to contraception for married couples); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (directing 
the education and rearing of one’s children)).  Henry warns, however, that “liberty as 
dignity, and the women who possess it, are playing an ever smaller role in the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence.  In their place, the Court proffers collective virtue as dignity to 
vindicate what it views as our decency and humanity.” Henry, supra note 86, at 227–28. 
 97. Henry, supra note 86, at 211 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(striking down the Texas sodomy law)); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating that 
“[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make” the 
choice “to enter upon [a personal relationship] in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives”). 
 98. Henry, supra note 86, at 219.  Henry, and the Court, however, may be more 
concerned with “our failure to respect people’s desire to present themselves as dignified, 
composed, and complete.” Id. (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656 (1989) (upholding governmental drug screening program requiring employees to urinate 
within hearing distance of monitors)). 
 99. Henry, supra note 86, at 221 (“Treating a person in a subhuman manner is wrong not 
only for the effect it has on that individual, but also for the consequences it has on collective 
humanity and society.”). See generally id. at 220–29.  Henry sees a particular role for 
“collective virtue as dignity” in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 222–27. 
 100. See supra Part III.A. 
 101. See supra Part III.B. 
18 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Henry’s analytic categories, there is historical basis for the Obergefell 
approach in equality as dignity and liberty as dignity, as well as perhaps in 
personal integrity as dignity, and even collective virtue as dignity.  Thus, 
the use of dignity to secure fundamental rights is not as foreign to the 
Court’s jurisprudence as some might assert. 
It is not possible to predict where this will lead LGB and other civil 
rights litigation, but the part that follows considers some possibilities. 
IV.  THE CRYSTAL BALL 
Notwithstanding this Essay’s focus on liberty and dignity in the LGB 
cases generally and in Obergefell in particular, Justice Kennedy did not 
leave equal protection doctrine on the cutting room floor.  He notes, in 
particular, “the synergy” between due process and equal protection, 
acknowledging their “profound” connection,102 even though “they set forth 
independent principles.”103  He powerfully concludes that “the right to 
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment[,] couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right 
and that liberty.”104 
In showing this renewed interest in resuscitating the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Court has taken further steps 
away from equal protection jurisprudence and the tiers it has found so 
troubling.105  Justice Kennedy’s failure to clarify the level of scrutiny that 
ought to apply to claims brought by LGB litigants106 has led some to 
 
 102. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
 103. Id. at 2603. 
 104. Id. at 2604.  In perhaps a nod to earlier equal protection cases, on more than one 
occasion in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy notes the “immutable nature” of sexual orientation. 
See, e.g., id. at 2594. 
 105. See Yoshino, supra note 40, at 748 (“[T]he Court has moved away from group-based 
equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to individual 
liberty claims under the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481 (2004) (discussing the complexity of traditional equal protection analysis); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (discussing the Court’s expansion of the 
doctrine of substantive due process and recognition of the role of the Court as more than 
strictly interpreting the text of the Constitution). 
 106. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Opinion, The Trouble with the ‘Dignity’ of Same-Sex 
Marriage, WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
trouble-with-the-dignity-of-same-sex-marriage/2015/07/02/43bd8f70-1f4e-11e5-aeb9-
a411a84c9d55_story.html (noting that Justice Kennedy’s ambiguity fails to clarify the 
standard of review to be used in other areas of discrimination faced by LGB individuals) 
[http://perma.cc/YA6C-8AGM]; see also Arthur S. Leonard, Supreme Court Issues Historic 
Marriage Equality Ruling, ART LEONARD OBSERVATIONS (June 26, 2015), http://www. 
artleonardobservations.com/supreme-court-issues-historic-marriage-equality-ruling/ (noting 
that Kennedy “avoided any explicit pronouncement about whether sexual orientation 
discrimination claims should be subject to heightened scrutiny”) [http://perma.cc/6NXH-
WK89]; cf. Andrew Hamm, Justice Ginsburg Discusses the Just-Ended Term, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/230798/ 
(summarizing Justice Ginsburg’s view that she would have preferred an expanded discussion 
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express concern that efforts to secure protections against discrimination in 
employment, housing, and public accommodations will be stymied.107  
Thus, the most trenchant concern is that liberty and dignity, while appealing 
on a philosophical level, will not be helpful in a pragmatic sense.108 
Further, although there is a certain beauty in the Court’s resting its 
reasoning on the anti-humiliation approach first used in Brown,109 this 
foundation may prove shaky.  Brown and the civil rights cases have not 
achieved the goal of eliminating de facto segregation or other forms of 
institutional humiliation.  One need only examine the abundant disparities 
between whites and people of color in high school and college graduation 
rates,110 experiences of employment discrimination,111 or measures of 
wealth accumulation112 to witness our ongoing inheritance of slavery and 
racism.113 
 
of equal protection in Obergefell but declined to draft a concurrence “because it was more 
powerful to have a single opinion”) [http://perma.cc/H786-LNHN]. 
 107. This concern is not merely hypothetical. See Ondo v. City of Cleveland, No. 14-
3527, 2015 WL 4604860, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2015); Arthur S. Leonard, 6th Circuit:  
Obergefell Decision Irrelevant to Equal Protection Claim, ART LEONARD OBSERVATIONS 
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.artleonardobservations.com/6th-circuit-obergefell-decision-
irrelevant-to-equal-protection-claim/ (stating that because the Supreme Court did not 
recognize gay people as a class deserving heightened scrutiny in Obergefell or otherwise, 
gay plaintiffs’ equal protection claims against police officers would be assessed using a 
rational basis standard and holding for the Government) [http://perma.cc/LCR7-C875]. But 
see Arthur S. Leonard, Nebraska Court Holds Anti-Gay Adoption/Foster Licensing Policy 
Violates 14th Amendment, ART LEONARD OBSERVATIONS (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www. 
artleonardobservations.com/nebraska-court-holds-anti-gay-adoptionfoster-licensing-policy-
violates-14th-amendment/ (describing state court ruling that Nebraska’s policy of not 
permitting gay people to be foster parents was unconstitutional pursuant to Obergefell) 
[http://perma.cc/5MQ9-JZ9C]. 
 108. See Nan D. Hunter, The Undetermined Legacy of ‘Obergefell v. Hodges’, THE 
NATION (June 29, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/the-undetermined-legacy-of-
obergefell-v-hodges/ (“Whatever this concept of dignity amounts to in constitutional law, it 
is a work in progress.”) [http://perma.cc/JH3Q-TC4G]. 
 109. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (discussing Ackerman’s anti-
humiliation principle in Brown). 
 110. See THE SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUBLIC EDUC., BLACK LIVES MATTER:  THE SCHOTT 50 
STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 7 (2015), http://www. 
blackboysreport.org/2015-black-boys-report.pdf (reporting that the gap between four-year 
graduation rate for Black males and Caucasian males widened nineteen points in the 2009–
10 school year to twenty-one points in the 2012–13 year and that, for the 2012–13 school 
year, the national graduation rate for Black males was 59 percent, compared to 80 percent 
for Caucasian males for the 2012–13 school year) [http://perma.cc/54DT-KXVM]. 
 111. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal?:  A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.pdf [http://perma.cc/QCT8-DGT5]. 
 112. See generally THOMAS SHAPIRO ET AL., INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, THE ROOTS 
OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP:  EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE 
2 (2013) (finding that the total wealth gap between White and African American families 
nearly triples over the course of twenty-five years, increasing from $85,000 in 1984 to 
$236,500 in 2009), http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgap 
brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LVC-G2FF]. 
 113. See ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 152 (observing that “eliminating humiliation 
hardly guarantees equal opportunity, let alone equal outcomes”). 
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Although Brown named the indignity of, and helped to dismantle, de jure 
segregation, the decision did not realign the economic and social injustices 
that existed then and that continue to persist.  Indeed, farther down the road, 
the Supreme Court may again “put the brakes on the anti-humiliation 
principle,” finding it more challenging to apply in the complex fact-based 
scenarios that are likely to be litigated.114 
Unlike Brown, however, implementation of Obergefell is fairly 
straightforward:  some forms may need to be changed and some marriage 
bureau clerks educated about their responsibilities.  Although there is 
resistance from some,115 implementation in the context of marriage is not 
likely to be a lasting concern.116 
It is, of course, impossible to predict how the Court’s dignity-based 
reasoning in Obergefell, and the three prior LGB cases—Romer, Lawrence, 
and Windsor—more generally, will be used in future litigation.117  It is 
possible that Obergefell and its dignity (anti-humiliation) approach to 
justice may have lasting power, not just for gay men and lesbians, but also 
more broadly.  Indeed, if courts are inclined to recognize liberty-associated 
dignity concerns, it will be notably more difficult for defendants to legally 
justify discrimination.  Notwithstanding the Court’s aversion to recognizing 
new populations entitled to heightened scrutiny,118 perhaps the Court has 
given claimants a way to justify lower courts applying more stringent 
review.119 
The strength of Obergefell will be seen in the challenges to come—the 
scope of exclusion carved out for those with religious beliefs inconsistent 
 
 114. Yoshino, supra note 73, at 3086.  Yoshino further observes:  “Once de jure 
restrictions on gay rights are removed, the Court may become blind to second-generation 
discrimination against gay individuals.  If this were the case, the gay-rights jurisprudence 
would track the race-discrimination jurisprudence.  The contemporary jurisprudence around 
race may be the future of gay constitutional rights, not its past.” Id. at 3086–87. 
 115. See Lyle Denniston, Contempt Hearing for Kentucky County Clerk, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sept. 1, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/contempt-hearing-for-
kentucky-county-clerk/ (discussing post-Obergefell incidents of recalcitrant county clerks 
who have refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, citing religious objections) 
[http://perma.cc/39AR-9S6S]. 
 116. See, e.g., Peter Delvecchio, Freedom to Marry’s Evan Wolfson Cried Tears of Joy 
Reading the Supreme Court Marriage Ruling, FRONTIERS MEDIA (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.frontiersmedia.com/frontiers-blog/2015/06/26/evan-wolfson-cried-reading-the-
supreme-court-marriage-ruling/2/ (quoting Evan Wolfson, Founder and Executive Director 
of Freedom to Marry, as saying, “I think the overwhelming response now is going to be the 
public’s embrace of [Obergefell], which the public supported even before the courts got 
there . . . so there will be some grumbling, there will be some acting out, maybe some foot 
dragging, but . . . I don’t think there’s going to be much, and the reality is the country is 
ready to embrace the freedom to marry”) [http://perma.cc/CET9-AXD3]. 
 117. See ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 291 (asserting that in Windsor, Justice Kennedy 
“is inviting a new generation to restore the original understanding of Brown to its central 
place in the civil rights legacy”). 
 118. See id. at 3080–88. 
 119. See Tribe, supra note 105, at 1937 (“The whole of substantive due process, 
Lawrence teaches us, is larger than, and conceptually different from, the sum of its parts.”). 
2015] THE POWER OF DIGNITY 21 
with the ruling of the Court120 and the degree to which discrimination 
against gay men and lesbians no longer will be tolerated in employment, 
housing, and public accommodations.121  Indeed, there remains significant 
work to be done, as seen by the introduction in Congress of the Equality 
Act,122 which seeks to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to extend its 
protections to gay men and lesbians. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether Obergefell will bode well for civil rights litigation, as I believe 
it has the power do, or will further undermine attempts to achieve at least 
formal equality, we will know only with the passage of time.  There is little 
doubt, however, that the Court—with its recognition of the nefarious and 
insidious nature of stigma and its extolling of the dignity of gay men and 
lesbians—has embraced our humanity in a way that leaves the language, 
outcome, and stigma of Bowers forever banished.  It is my hope that the 
Court’s actions will help the next generation of LGB individuals grow up 
fully embracing their dignity, without the pain of stigma experienced by so 
many LGB people of my and earlier generations. 
Indeed, if I had been told in the 1980s that within a short three decades 
the Supreme Court not only would recognize the stigma imposed on and 
internalized by so many LGB individuals, but also that it would find that 
the U.S. Constitution requires that gay couples must be permitted to marry, 
I do not think I would have believed it.123  But, here we are.  Let us seize 
this moment and celebrate! 
 
 120. See Samuel A. Marcosson, After Obergefell:  Balancing Religious Accommodation 
Against the Rights of Others, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.acslaw.org/ 
acsblog/after-obergefell-balancing-religious-accommodation-against-the-rights-of-others 
[http://perma.cc/UJW8-LAKN]. 
 121. See, e.g., Lauren Gambino, Catholic School Teacher Fired After Parents Learn of 
Her Same-Sex Marriage, THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2015, 1:35 PM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/us-news/2015/jul/09/pennsylvania-catholic-school-teacher-fired-same-sex-marriage 
[http://perma.cc/58RJ-97CS]; Timothy M. Phelps, New Frontier for Gays is Employment 
and Housing Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015, 7:23 AM), http://www.latimes. 
com/nation/la-na-gays-employment-20150626-story.html#page=1 (profiling Katrina Martir, 
a teacher from Kentucky, who was fired after marrying her same-sex partner because of the 
school administration’s fear of parent backlash over the employment of a lesbian teacher) 
[http://perma.cc/6F23-F52Q]. 
 122. Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 123. The relatively rapid pace of change was not a matter of happenstance.  As described 
by Mary Bonuato, Legal Director of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), 
and Evan Wolfson, the marriage equality movement was well planned and well executed, 
incorporating grassroots organizing, legislative advocacy, and litigation strategizing. See 
Fresh Air:  From DOMA to Marriage Equality:  How the Tide Turned for Gay Marriage, 
(NPR July 9, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/09/421462180/from-doma-to-marriage-
equality-how-the-tide-turned-for-gay-marriage [http://perma.cc/2V99-GMCA].  I recognize 
there are risks of assimilation in this increasing level of legal, political, cultural, and 
structural acceptance. See, e.g., The Dignity of Marriage:  Gays on the Wrong Side of 
History, A PAPER BIRD (JULY 14, 2015), http://paper-bird.net/2015/07/14/the-dignity-of-
marriage (describing the joy engendered by the Obergefell ruling, but rejecting the vehicle of 
“dignity” to establish marriage equality) [http://perma.cc/MC5N-6PC9]; Phoebe Reilly, New 
TV Series, New Movie:  Just Another Day at the Office with Lily Tomlin, VULTURE (Aug. 12, 
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2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.vulture.com/2015/08/day-at-the-office-with-lily-tomlin.html 
(quoting lesbian comedian and actor Lily Tomlin as saying, “In some ways I yearn for 
suppression, because the taboo made things more exciting,” quickly adding, “I mean that 
facetiously. I’m grateful for progress”) [http://perma.cc/G8F6-JQQ9].  Yet, these are the 
risks I readily embrace. 
